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Introduction 
The distribution of medal wins across nations at Summer Olympics is extremely 
uneven between developed and developing countries: the former – about 40 nations 
– concentrate from two-thirds to three-quarters of medal wins while the latter - about 
160 nations – obtain from one-quarter to one-third of medals total. This observation 
suggests a likely relationship between a nation‟s Olympic sport performance and its 
level of economic development. Indeed, it has been empirically verified that the 
number of medals a country wins at Summer Olympics significantly depends on its 
population and GDP per inhabitant (Andreff, 2001). Thus, in a sense, the number of 
medal wins at the Olympics can be regarded as an additional index of economic 
development, just like the literacy rate, the percentage of children attending primary 
school, health expenditures per inhabitant, mortality or morbidity rates. On the other 
hand, the level of economic development and population could be used as realistic 
predictors of Olympic performances.  
The only sport mega-event which can compare to Summer Olympics in terms of fan 
attendance, TV viewing and economic impact is FIFA soccer World Cup. Nobody 
knows whether a nation‟s level of economic development may impact on its sport 
performance at soccer World Cup since such an issue remains unheeded in the 
literature so far, whatever one refers to sports economics or development economics. 
One motivation of this article is to provide a first insight into this issue and, the other 
way round, check whether a nation‟s performance at soccer World Cup may have 
any sense in reflecting its economic development. Econometric estimation of how 
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much significant are the economic determinants of medal wins by each participating 
nation is now quite usual. Our core research question is: would a model based on 
population and GDP per capita as determinants perform as well in explaining soccer 
World Cup outcomes as it is used to perform with Olympic medal wins? Since the 
estimated model has provided a good prediction of medal wins at the next Olympics, 
would it be able to predict FIFA World Cup outcomes with a similar success? 
After a brief look at modelling and predicting Summer Olympics medal distribution 
(1), a slightly improved model is estimated and then implemented to predict how 
many medals each nation would have obtained at the 2008 Olympics (2). The 
prediction is compared to actual outcomes observed in Beijing (3). A next step is to 
understand why a similar prediction model has not yet emerged with regards to FIFA 
World Cup: a major reason is that the soccer World Cup outcome is rather 
unpredictable due to a number of “surprises” – surprising outcomes – during its final 
tournament (4). Thus, adapting the model of Olympic medals prediction to FIFA 
World Cup requires that some football-specific or “footballistic” variables be 
introduced alongside with economic variables (5). Such emended model is estimated 
on the basis of past FIFA World Cup results (6), and then used to predict the semi-
finalists at the 2010 World Cup in South Africa (7). Since the predictions regarding 
the last soccer World Cup do not exhibit good results, performance in the latter is 
meaningless as an index of economic development. Moreover, this opens an avenue 
for further research about the notion of surprising sporting outcome and its metrics 
(8). The conclusion emphasizes that economic prediction of sport performances is to 
be taken with a pinch of salt. 
 
1. Economic determinants of Olympic medals 
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More than thirty studies have looked for the determinants of Olympic performances 
since 1956 combining socio-economic variables with weather, nutrition, mortality in 
the athlete‟s home nation, protein consumption, religion, colonial past, newspapers 
supply, urban population, life expectancy, geographical surface area, military 
expenditures, judicial system and those sport disciplines taught at school. A 
widespread assumption across sports economists who have participated to these 
studies is that a nation‟s Olympic performance must be determined by its endowment 
in – and the level of development of - economic and human resources captured 
through GDP per capita and population. Notice that an increase in the number of 
medal wins by one country logically is an equivalent decrease in medals won by all 
other participating nations. Therefore, if one wants to explain the Olympic 
performance of one specific nation, one has to take into account all other 
participating nations within the overall constraint of the distributed medals total.  
During the cold war period, another significant variable emerged: a nation‟s political 
regime. The first Western work attempting to explain medal wins by nations‟ political 
regime (Ball, 1972) triggered a Soviet rejoinder (Novikov and Maximenko, 1972), 
both differentiating capitalist from communist regimes. The first two econometric 
analyses of Olympic Games (Grimes et al., 1974; Levine, 1974) exhibited that, when 
regressing medal wins on GDP per capita and population, communist countries were 
outliers: they were winning more medals than their level of economic development 
and population were likely to predict. A last variable has been introduced, namely 
since Clarke (2000), which is the influence on medal wins of being the Olympics 
hosting country, i.e. a sort of home advantage. The host gains more medals than 
otherwise due to big crowds of national fans, a stronger national athletes‟ motivation 
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when competing on their home ground and being adapted to local weather, and not 
tired by a long pre-Games travel. 
Econometric methodology has developed in more recent studies such as an ordered 
Logit model (Andreff, 2001), a Probit model (Nevill et al., 2002) or an ordered Probit 
model (Johnson and Ali, 2004) in which a quadratic specification in GDP per capita is 
employed to capture a postulated inverted U-shaped relationship meaning that higher 
levels of GDP per capita have a positive impact on medal wins though decreasing 
after some threshold. The most quoted reference is Bernard and Busse (2004) 
whose model has been widely used in further studies. In this Tobit model 
implemented for estimating and predicting Olympic performances, the two major 
independent variables - GDP per capita and population – are taken on board with 
three dummies that capture a host country effect, the influence of belonging to 
Soviet-type and other communist (and post-Soviet and post-communist after 1990) 
countries as against being a capitalist market economy.  
 
2. Predicting Olympic medals distribution in Beijing 2008 
 
Starting from Bernard and Busse, after a few emendations, a more specified model 
has been elaborated on (Andreff et al., 2008). The dependent variable is each 
nation‟s number of medal wins1: Mi,t. The first two independent variables are GDP per 
capita and population. Contrary to Bernard and Busse, it is not assumed here that 
preparing an Olympic team is timeless and, then, independent variables are four 
years lagged: GDP per inhabitant (Y/N)i,t-4 in 1995 purchasing power parity dollars 
and population Ni,t-4 (World Bank data). The assumption is that four years are 
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required to build up, train, prepare and make an Olympic team the most competitive 
in due time. A Host dummy is used to capture a home advantage. 
 Bernard and Busse divide the world into communist regimes and capitalist market 
economies which obviously fits with the cold war period. Since then, this is too crude 
with regards to post-communist transition economies: the sports economy sector has 
differentiated a lot across former socialist countries during their institutional 
transformation process (Poupaux and Andreff, 2007). Such differentiation has 
translated into a scattered efficiency in winning Olympic medals after 1991 (Rathke 
and Woitek, 2008). A first emendation to Bernard and Busse‟s model is introduced 
here with a classification that distinguishes Central Eastern European countries 
(CEEC) which have left a Soviet-type planned economy in 1989 or 1990, and 
transformed into a democratic political regime running a market economy: Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
(and Czechoslovakia until the 1993 split), Slovenia, and the GDR (until German 
reunification in 1990). Another commonality to this group is that these countries have 
joined the European Union.  
A second country group (TRANS) gathers new independent states (former Soviet 
republics) and some former CMEA member states which have started up a similar 
process of transition but are lagging behind the CEECs in terms of transformation 
into a democratic regime and are stalling on the path toward a market economy: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. None of them 
has joined the EU so far or has really an option to do so. The next two groups have 
not been Soviet regimes properly speaking in the past, although they have been both 
communist regimes and planned economies. In the first one (NSCOM), we sample 
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those countries which have started up a transition process in the 1990s: Albania, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, China, Croatia, Laos, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia (and 
the former FSR Yugoslavia before the 1991 break up). Two countries have not yet 
engaged into a democratic transformation and a market economy: Cuba and North 
Korea. They must be considered as still communist regimes (COM). All other 
countries are regarded as capitalist market economies (CAPME), the reference 
group in our estimations. Table 1 exhibits uneven medal distribution by political 
regime.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
Beyond Bernard and Busse, a variable supposed to capture the influence on Olympic 
performance of a specific sporting culture in a region is introduced. For example, 
Afghan (and other Middle East) ladies are not used to have much sport participation 
or attend sport shows, even less to be enrolled in an Olympic team. Resulting from 
these cultural disparities, some nations are more specialised in one specific sport 
discipline such as weight-lifting in Bulgaria, Turkey, Armenia, and the Balkans, 
marathon and long distance run in Ethiopia and Kenya, cycling in Belgium and the 
Netherlands, table tennis, judo and martial arts in various Asian countries, sprint in 
Caribbean islands and the U.S., and so on. It is not easy to design a variable that 
would exactly capture such regional sporting culture differences2, but it is assumed 
that regional dummies may reflect them. The world is divided into nine sporting 
culture regions: AFS, sub-Sahara African countries; AFN: North African countries; 
NAM, North America; LSA, Latin and South America; EAST, Eastern Europe; WEU, 
Western Europe (taken as the reference region in our estimation); OCE, Oceania; 
MNE, Middle East; and ASI, (other) Asian countries. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
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A first specification is simply à la Bernard and Busse, but with a differently defined 
political regime variable, with a censored Tobit model since a non negligible number 
of countries that participate to the Olympics do not win any medal. Therefore, a zero 
value of the Mi,t dependent variable does not mean that a country has not 
participated and we work out a simple Tobit, not a Tobit 2 (with a two stage Heckman 
procedure)3. Dummies test whether the Olympic year is significant, taking 2004 as 
the reference. These dummies come out to be non significant. In a second 
specification, a data panel Tobit is adopted, in order to take into account unobserved 
heterogeneity, whose test is significant4, and thus estimation with random effects is 
opted for. Data5 encompass all Summer Olympics from 1976 to 2004, except 1980 
and 1984 which are skipped out due to boycotts which have distorted the medal 
distribution per country. Therefore a first specification (1) is:  
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A second specification (2) adds the above described dummy standing for sporting 
culture regions (Regionr,i): 
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A third specification (3) contains an additional variable Mi,t-4 on the right-hand side 
just like in Bernard and Busse who do not comment why they proceed in such a way. 
The interpretation here is that winning medals at previous Olympics matters for an 
Olympic national team which usually expects and attempts to achieve at least as well 
as four years ago. Such inertial effect is all the more relevant for those nations eager 
to win as many medals as possible, that is for most nations winning more than zero 
medals.  
The third specification (3) is used to predict the medal distribution at Beijing 
Olympics: 
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Insert Table 3 about here 
All estimations deliver significant results (Table 3). In the first one, all coefficients are 
positive and significant at a 1% threshold, except for year dummies. It is confirmed 
once again that medal wins are determined by GDP per capita, population and a host 
country effect. Political regime is also an explanatory variable. The second estimation 
all in all exhibits the same results. The coefficients of regional sporting culture are 
significant except for Latin America, an area where the North American sporting 
culture may have permeated namely through Caribbean countries and Mexico 
(classified in NAM). 
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Since Western Europe is the reference a significant coefficient with a positive 
(negative) sign means that a region performs relatively better (worse) than Western 
Europe in terms of medal wins. Sub-Sahara Africa, North America and Oceania 
perform better. Though a little bit surprising for Sub-Sahara African countries since 
they are among the least developed in the world (except South Africa), this is due to 
a few countries which are extremely specialised in one sport discipline where they 
are capable of a non negligible number of medal wins, such as Ethiopia and Kenya in 
long distance runs. With negative coefficients, North Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe 
and Middle East perform worse. It is not surprising for North Africa and the Middle 
East due to some sport practice restrictions in the culture of various countries. In the 
case of Asia, only few countries are capable of a significant number of medal wins 
(China, both Koreas, Mongolia) given their GDP per capita. Since Eastern European 
countries are known as outliers - over-performers (given their GDP per capita and 
population) a negative coefficient results from the Political Regime already capturing 
their over-performance.  
The pooling estimation6 of Model 3 may suffer from endogeneity since the results 
may be biased by a correlation between the lagged endogenous variable and the 
error term. This issue is treated with a GMM dynamic panel (Arellano and Bond, 
1991), a technique which provides estimated coefficients and predictions that are 
robust and close to those estimated with a Tobit model. Our predictions show up in 
Table 4 for a country sub-sample7. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
The predicted first-rank winner is the United States, followed by Russia, and China 
which benefits from home advantage. Most developed market economies are 
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predicted to be among the major medal winners together with some post-communist 
transition countries. 
 
 
 
3. Predictions and actual results: medal wins are rather predictable 
 
Comparing predictions with the actual medal distribution that has come out from 
Beijing Olympics, the model performs well. It has provided good predictions: 70% of 
the observed results are encompassed in our predicted confidence interval (among 
those 189 countries for which data were available and computable). If prediction is 
assessed as acceptable when the error margin is not bigger than a two medal 
difference between prevision and actual outcome, then the model correctly predicts 
88% of all Beijing results. The remaining unforeseen 12% account for surprises – 
unexpectedly surprising outcomes. The model correctly predicts the first ten medal 
winners, except Japan (instead of Ukraine), misses four out of the first twenty 
winners, though with a slightly different ranking. However, the most interesting is 
when model prediction is clearly wrong, that is basically for 23 nations, meaning that 
the five variables (plus the inertial variable) have not captured some core explanation 
of the Olympics outcome. Fortunately, economists are not capable to predict all 
Olympic results, otherwise why still convene the Games?  
The major surprise in the actual outcomes, compared to model predictions, is the 
quite bigger than expected medal wins by the Chinese team – all published 
predictions have been wrong in this respect. The host country effect in China has 
been underestimated. Possibly, Chinese performance has also been boosted by 
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some undetected doping8. A second surprise is the underperformance of the Russian 
Olympic team, the worst since the cold war. Vladimir Putin convened the highest 
decision makers of Russian sport to command a new Olympic policy likely to avoid a 
repeated disaster at the 2012 London Olympics. In the same vein, some other 
transition countries, namely Romania, have won fewer medals than predicted in 
Beijing. The current state of restructuring the whole sports sector in these countries 
has not been sufficiently captured by our refined political regime variable.  
The last three significant surprises are Great Britain, Jamaica and Kenya, the latter 
being the only two developing countries among the first twenty medal winners. Early 
preparation of a super-competitive team for the 2012 London Olympics may have 
been the cause for higher than predicted outcomes of the British team, as it is 
suggested by Maennig and Wellebrock (2008) who have introduced a “next Olympics 
host country” variable in their prediction. Great Britain‟s medals concentration in 
cycling (12 medals) may trace back again to undetected doping and/or deep 
specialisation of a nation in one sport discipline. The latter is the most likely 
explanation for Jamaican medals9 concentrated in sprint and Kenyan medals in long 
distance runs. Though we have taken into account such specialisation through our 
lagged Mi,t-4 variable – Kenya had won 7 medals and Jamaica 5 in the same 
disciplines at Athens Olympics -, the inertia captured with this variable reveals to be 
insufficient.  
 
4. Prediction of FIFA World Cup semi-finalists: why it is so hard? 
 
The economics of FIFA World Cup outcome is much less developed than the 
economic approach to Olympic medal wins. There are two ways of explaining 
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international soccer successes in the literature. The most common method is to 
explain FIFA points and ranking (the FIFA/Coca Cola World Ranking for all national 
football teams) at one point in time (Hoffmann et al., 2002b; Houston et al., 2002; 
Macmillan and Smith, 2007; Leeds and Marikova Leeds, 2009; Yamamura, 2009). 
The second one consists in explaining a nation‟s success in FIFA World Cup over 
time. To the best of our knowledge, economic determinants of the soccer World Cup 
outcome have only been touched three times in the literature so far. From the three 
papers, it appears that surprising outcomes are the most common occurrence. 
Torgler (2004) attempts explaining the determinants of the 2002 soccer World Cup 
outcome. The dependent variable is a dummy that measures whether a team wins a 
game or not in the World Cup final tournament. Explanatory variables are not 
economic. A variable captures the strength of a team through its FIFA ranking, and 
the positive influence on success of being the hosting team. A second set of 
variables is introduced regarding the performance of a team during a game: shots on 
goal, fouls, corner kicks, free kicks, off sides, cautions, expulsions, actual playing 
time (based on ball possession). The major result is that higher FIFA ranking leads to 
higher probability of winning a game: a one place improvement in world ranking 
increases a team‟s probability of winning by approximately 1%, but this result is not 
always significant. Higher number of shots on goal drives higher probability of 
winning; having a referee from the same region has a positive impact on the 
probability of winning a game, but this effect is not statistically significant10. 
A prediction model of FIFA World Cup outcome is due to Paul and Mitra (2008). It is 
not based on economic variables either. The authors remind that in the past four 
FIFA World Cup tournaments, 1994 to 2006, the top team in FIFA ranking never won, 
except Brazil in 1994. However, they test the relevance of the last FIFA ranking 
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published before the World Cup final tournament as a benchmark to evaluate teams‟ 
performance. In a Probit model, the dependent variable is a dummy that measures 
whether a team wins (1 = win, 0 otherwise) a game or not. The main explanatory 
variable is FIFA ranking with controlling for the number of goals scored by each 
team, and the number of yellow and red cards. A second OLS testing considers the 
scored goal difference as the dependent variable and FIFA rank difference is the 
main independent variable with controlling for goals scored, the number of yellow and 
red cards, the number of corner kicks, the number of fouls, the percentage of ball 
possession, and match attendance. Higher FIFA ranking is significantly associated 
with higher probability of winning a game. Higher-ranked teams score more goals. A 
more surprising result is that, though a higher number of yellow or red cards are less 
likely to win a game, in 2002 and 2006 teams with more yellow cards were more 
likely to win a game (and teams with more red cards in the 1998 Cup as well). Other 
surprises are that more corner kicks and more ball possession are associated with 
losing a game. Overall higher-ranked favourites have the winning trend in their 
favour, but there is a number of unexpected match outcomes. This is why it is so 
hard to estimate determinants and make predictions.  
Monks and Husch (2009) test whether FIFA World Cup format may lead to a slightly 
rigged contest or, at least, whether it may favour certain teams, in particular the host 
country. In the tournament history, only seven teams have ever won the World Cup 
(Brazil 5 times, Italy 4, Germany 3, Argentina and Uruguay 2, England and France 1). 
Of the 18 tournaments held to date, the host has won six times. The authors test the 
impact of seeding, home continent and hosting on FIFA Cup outcome from 1982 to 
2006. The dependent variable is a national team‟s World Cup final standing (from the 
winner down to the 32th among the qualified according to their performance during 
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the final tournament), and it is regressed on a team‟s FIFA rank before the World 
Cup, a dummy variable for being top seeded, a host country dummy, and a dummy 
variable if the World Cup is being played on a team‟s own continent. Ex ante rank is 
positive and significant in determining a team‟s final standing. Being top seeded 
results in an increase in final standing of approximately 5 places and the home 
continent advantage is approximately 2.8 places (but not significant). Both effects 
probably overlap with the host country variable (the host country is top seeded by 
definition) which provides 3 places better than the expected final standing, but the 
result is not significant. Rank, being the host country and playing on one‟s home 
continent11 determine advancement in the tournament to either the quarterfinals or 
semi-finals.  
 
5. Adapting the Olympics medal model to FIFA World Cup outcome 
 
From the above-mentioned studies it is clear that explaining FIFA World Cup 
outcome is much harder than finding in socio-economic variables the determinants of 
Olympics medal wins, for different reasons. Soccer is a sport discipline which is more 
widespread in some countries (for instance Latin American countries) than others, 
whatever their level of economic development, the size of their population and their 
democratic or autocratic regime. Such specificity requires the introduction of some 
„footballistic‟ variables in the estimation. To the contrary, the Olympics cover so many 
sport disciplines that overall economic development of a nation affects overall 
nation‟s sporting outcome, beyond disparities in performance across different sports 
– thus GDP and population are germane to stand for a significant share of the 
determinants. The number of surprising outcomes is much higher with the soccer 
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World Cup than with the Olympics also because in one case the surprises pertain to 
just one sport discipline whereas with the Olympics there are unexpected (surprising) 
medal wins in some sports that may, on average, compensate surprising medal 
“losses” in other sports for the Olympic teams from big (population) and rich (GDP 
per capita) nations.  
Moreover, the two contests have different formats. In most Olympics disciplines12, 
after a preliminary knock-out selection, eight athletes remain in contention for the 
finals and the first three best are rewarded with (gold, silver and bronze) medals 
during the finals. Thus it is not extremely tricky to build up an estimation of the 
determinants of medal wins - the first three ranked athletes (nations). It is more 
complex with FIFA World Cup final tournament since this contest combines a round 
robin first stage before the 1/8th finals and, then, a knock-out second stage from the 
1/8th finals on. The uncertainty of outcome markedly increases from the first to the 
second stage (Monks and Husch, 2009) and, thus, the impact of economic variables 
might well dilute in the course of some knock-out games (thus the surprising 
outcome). This lays ground for the choice of dependent variable to have it as much 
comparable as possible with medal wins: it is chosen as the four nations making it for 
the semi-finals (Semifin) of a soccer World Cup final tournament. The determinants 
of being one of the four highest-ranked teams in the final tournament are looked for – 
and this facilitates using the same estimation model as the one explaining Olympics 
medal wins. The four highest-ranked are the winner, the finalist and two losing semi-
finalists which play a ranking game the day before the final. Given the dependent 
variable (making for the semi-finals = 1; otherwise 0), a Probit model is estimated.  
All national teams which have participated to the semi-finals are exhibited in 
Appendix 1 with their cumulative participation from the first 1930 World Cup up to 
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2006. Retaining the semi-finalists as the dependent variable also makes sense when 
referring to FIFA economic incentives. Given FIFA distribution rules, each team 
entering the World Cup final tournament earns a 3.79 million € bonus (in 2006). The 
next step – reaching the 1/8th finals – increases this amount by an extra 1.59 million 
€, followed by an additional 1.90 million € bonus when making it for the quarterfinals. 
Then for qualifying to the semi-finals, there is a huge jump of 6.33 million €, followed 
by only 630,000 € extra to make it for the finals and winning the finals adds another 
1.27 million € (Coupé, 2007). In economic terms, it is rather significant to qualify for 
the semi-finals.  
Independent variables are selected with a double purpose in mind: a/ comparing 
whether the same socio-economic variables play a role in determining FIFA World 
Cup outcome as with Summer Olympics medal wins; b/ finding a sample of socio-
economic and footballistic variables that explain the soccer World Cup outcome in 
the long run, in order to come up with an ex post benchmark model that can be used 
further in ex ante predicting the semi-finalists of the 2010 World Cup. Due to data 
availability, the retained observation period runs from the 1962 soccer World Cup up 
to 2006, which includes 12 final tournaments. Data cover all national teams which 
have participated to soccer World Cup final tournaments since 1962 – that is 16 from 
1962 to 1978, 24 teams from 1982 to 1994, and then 32 teams from 1998 on, i.e. 272 
observations in an obviously unbalanced panel.  
Population (Pop) and GDP per 1,000 inhabitants (GDP/cap) are the first two 
independent variables considered just like in the Olympics medal model (World Bank 
data). Squares are added for both variables (Pop2 and GDP/cap2), in tune with 
Houston et al. (2002) and Macmillan and Smith (2007), in order to control for possible 
decreasing returns of population and GDP per capita in terms of soccer World Cup 
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performance. The expectation is that population would have a positive effect on 
reaching the semi-finals while the specificity of soccer may lead to either significant 
or non significant effect of GDP per capita. These variables are introduced in the 
model with a two year time lag under a similar assumption as with the Olympics: the 
economic size and level of development of a nation two years ago is the context in 
which the preparation and training of a national soccer team starts up. In the two 
years after a FIFA World Cup, national teams are used to participate to a regional 
international contest such as UEFA Euro or the African Cup of Nations. Preparing the 
World Cup really starts up after the end of such contests (which means in t-2) when 
countries start playing the preliminary World Cup qualification stage at a regional 
level13. 
In previous studies, it has appeared that a nation‟s history in the football domain, 
such as World Cup appearances and the length of FIFA membership, matters when 
explaining its international soccer performance. Given our objective of explaining 
semi-finals participation, a specific semi-final history variable (SFstory) is derived 
from the data in Appendix 1. It is calculated by dividing all the figures in Appendix 1 
by the number of FIFA World Cup final tournaments from 1930 up to the year 
appearing in a column of Appendix 1 (for instance, in the 2006 column, all figures are 
divided by 18, in 2002 by 17 and so on). This variable describes the uneven long-
term capacity of a national team to make it for the semi-finals in a historical 
perspective and ranks nations according to this capacity. When one talks about 
“footballistic” nations or football-involved countries, Germany, Brazil, or Italy are often 
mentioned: indeed, they have been the most frequent semi-finalists at FIFA World 
Cups. As in previous studies, FIFA rank is tested as one explanatory variable, taking 
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FIFA ranking one month before the beginning of the final tournament, and a dummy 
(Host) for being the hosting country.  
A regional variable (Reg) is different from the one used in the Olympics medal model. 
The latter‟s purpose was to capture a regional sport culture effect while in the case of 
FIFA World Cup it must measure the relative strength and density of elite football in 
six different geographical zones into which FIFA is divided, that is: AFC for Asia, CAF 
for Africa, CONMEBOL for South America, OFC for Oceania, UEFA for Europe, and 
CONCACAF for North, Central America, and the Caribbean. Seeding of the final 
tournament round robin stage varies across years but is based on teams‟ successes 
from each region in previous World Cups and organised in such a way as to assure 
that top-seeded teams will not have to play each other until the second phase (1/8th 
finals) of the final tournament (Monks and Husch, 2009).  
A last assumption to be tested is whether a soccer-oriented nation, that is one which 
the number of players is relatively high compared to overall population, is successful 
in international soccer. The argument goes alongside with a pyramidal explanation of 
elite sport stating that the larger the mass of sport participants at the pyramid base, 
the better the elite top. Thus, most football-oriented nations should have highest 
probability to qualify for FIFA World Cup semi-finals. The number of (registered) 
soccer players (Players) divided by population can capture such possible effect. 
Estimating the determinants of FIFA World Cup semi-finalists relies on a Probit 
model: 
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where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution. 
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The paucity of available data for FIFArank and Players has led to estimate three 
different specifications. FIFA ranking is only available since 1993, when FIFA started 
publishing it, whereas the number of registered soccer players in all national 
federations has been published only in 2000 and 2006 (FIFA Big Count, 2000 and 
2006), which markedly reduces the size of the data sample. Thus in a first M1 
specification, these two variables are not taken on board. In a second M2 
specification, FIFA ranking is introduced but the sample is reduced to four World 
Cup final tournaments (1994 to 2006). Since FIFA ranking does not show up as 
statistically significant with M2, it is excluded in a third M3 specification whereas the 
proportion of registered players in the population is taken on board, assuming that 
the data for 2000 is acceptable for estimating the 2002 FIFA World Cup outcome. 
With a small and unbalanced panel, Probit estimation is used as a first step. Then to 
tackle the endogeneity of the semi-final history variable, a Probit model with an 
endogenous regressor and instrumental variables is resorted to. Valid instruments 
must be exogenous sources of variation in the semi-finalists, and it is difficult to think 
of candidate instruments relevant to explain international soccer performance 
(Macmillan and Smith, 2007). Thus, those exogenous variables of the best previous 
estimated model are retained as instruments. 
 
6. Socio-economic and “footballistic” determinants of FIFA World Cup semi-
finalists 
 
Before estimating M1, a preliminary testing has shown that adding year dummies to 
M1 comes out with none of these year dummies being significant. Therefore we do 
not proceed with panel data estimation.  
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Insert Table 5 about here 
The estimation of M1 shows that population and population squared is significant at a 
1% threshold; the size of a nation matters with decreasing returns. Hosting the World 
Cup is also a significant determinant of making for the semi-finals. The host country 
has often muddled through the first round robin phase of the tournament to qualify for 
the semi-finals. The impact of belonging to each of the six regions on qualifying for 
the semi-finals is not significant for four regions out of six. Taking these four regions 
as the reference, Europe and South America show up as significant variables at a 
1% threshold. Being a European or South American team significantly increases the 
probability of being semi-finalist. Most semi-finalists have been either European or 
South American teams so far. A last significant variable, though only at 10%, is the 
semi-final history variable. Having participated to past semi-finals has a positive 
effect on the probability of reaching this stage again. GDP per capita and its square 
are not significant. This makes a major difference between FIFA World Cup based on 
a single sport discipline and the multi-sport Olympics. The latter‟s outcome is 
determined by the level of economic development in participating countries whereas 
the former is not.  
With M2, tested from 1994 to 2006, the introduction of FIFA ranking as an 
independent variable has a devastating effect. Most variables become non 
significant, namely population, population squared and hosting the World Cup. FIFA 
rank itself is not significant either. The problem with this variable is endogeneity since 
its calculation includes each team performance (namely qualifying for the semi-finals) 
in the past three World Cups14 and thus FIFA ranking interferes with the semi-final 
history. The host country effect fades away from the determinants of qualifying for the 
semi-finals, against the frequent host nation expectation that its team has a home 
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advantage to qualify. Overall, M2 is the most difficult specification to interpret even 
though it maintains the European and South American regions as significant 
determinants of making for the semi-finals. The semi-final history remains significant 
at 10% and prevails over FIFA ranking as the relevant footballistic variable. 
The number of soccer players per inhabitant in each participating nation is introduced 
in M3 instead of FIFA rank. The estimation is run for the last two World Cups, which 
is in itself a limitation to M3. Then, the host variable is automatically dropped 
because there are only two observations. The number of players is not significant 
which may be interpreted as follows: soccer mass participation is not a determinant 
of a nation‟s participation to the semi-finals of the World Cup final tournament. This 
invalidates for soccer the pyramidal view of sport where the larger the pyramid base 
of mass participation, the higher performance in international contests. On the other 
hand, population is significant, the semi-final history variable is even more significant 
(at 5%) than in previous specifications while GDP per capita and squared become 
significant at 10%. However, regional variables, Europe and South America, are not 
significant because only two World Cups are kept: in 2006, no South American team 
has reached the semi-finals whereas in 2002 one semi-finalist was neither European 
nor South American (South Korea).  
Finally, a control for endogeneity between the dependent variable and one 
explanatory variable, the semi-final history, is required. The latter is influenced by 
each new World Cup results, though in the long run these results have a decreasing 
marginal effect on our cumulative variable. Thus, the semi-final history is used as an 
endogenous regressor and all other variables taken on board in M1 as instruments. 
First, the semi-final history variable is regressed on population, population squared, 
GDP per capita and squared, hosting the Cup and regional variables, and then the 
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relationship between the dependent variable (making for the semi-finals) and the 
endogenous „semi-final history‟ regressor is studied.  
Insert Table 6 about here 
Table 6 shows that all the instrumental variables are explanatory of the semi-final 
history except the host dummy. It is logical since the semi-final history variable is a 
cumulative percentage over 18 Cups whereas a country has been hosting the Cup 
only once or twice15. Now the model is quite consistent and close to the Olympics 
medal model since not only population and regional variables but also GDP per 
capita are significant determinants of FIFA World Cup outcome. A clear specificity is 
that hosting the soccer World Cup is not a comparable advantage to the one of 
hosting Summer Olympics. However, such reality has been blurred for a long time by 
the World Cup being always located either in Europe or South America until 1990. 
Since then, the number of exceptions has increased with one location in North 
America (1994), Asia (2002) and Africa (2010). 
  
7. The prediction for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa: still so hard! 
 
The model estimated with instrumental variables as well as M1 specification are now 
used to forecast the 2010 FIFA World Cup semi-finalists, taking into account the data 
for population and GDP in 2008, and the cumulative semi-final history variable up to 
2006. The prediction is exhibited in Table 7.  
Insert Table 7 about here 
The four teams with the highest probability to make for the semi-finals in South Africa 
are the same with both M1 and the model with instrumental variables. If one 
interprets the two highest ranks (probabilities) as the most probable finalists, the 
former predicts Germany playing Italy in the finals while the latter forecasts Germany 
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playing Brazil. France is ranked fourth in both cases. Compared to FIFA ranking 
published in May 2010, these results are strikingly different: the first four FIFA-ranked 
teams are Brazil and Spain (potential finalists), then Portugal and the Netherlands. 
Brazil is the most widely admitted semi-finalist whatever the methodology used for 
prediction. If one goes as far as interpreting these rankings as a probability to 
participate to the 1/8th finals, there is a good chance that Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
England, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Serbia, Spain, 
and Uruguay would qualify for the second stage of the 2010 soccer World Cup final 
tournament. Since the two models encompass a host country effect, both predict 
South Africa qualifying for the second stage of the final tournament contrarily to this 
nation‟s FIFA ranking (83rd in May 2010). Of course, those fourteen teams16 which 
are not mentioned in Table 7 would be big surprises if qualified for the semi-finals. 
None of them has made it! 
Actually, the four semi-finalists of the 2010 World Cup have been: 1/ Spain, 2/ 
Netherlands, 3/ Germany, 4/ Uruguay. Thus our model did not perform with the 
soccer World Cup as well as it did with Olympic medals since it correctly predicted 
only one semi-finalist (Germany). Nobody (see below) expected Uruguay to qualify 
for the semi-finals while it is the fifth best probability (behind France) to qualify in our 
model prediction.  
The banking business has recently started using predictions of the soccer World Cup 
outcome as an appealing factor to investors with integrating these predictions in the 
promotion of financial products. Consequently, some banks‟ economists have 
elaborated on prediction models that can be compared – including their results – with 
our model. Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan and UBS (Union des Banques Suisses) 
have produced a prognosis about the semi-finalists of the 2010 soccer World Cup.  
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Goldman Sachs (2010) has predicted the following semi-finalists, ranked according 
to their probability to qualify: 1/ Brazil, 2/ Spain, 3/ Germany, 4/ England - two correct 
out of four – with a methodology primarily based on bookmakers‟ odds 
(Ladbrokes.com) as of May 4, 2010 and partly on simulating the outcome of each 
qualification group and then of each of the hypothetical resulting match during the 
knock out stage. However some guesstimates interfere as: “from Group A, France 
would seem the strongest, but Mexico looks dangerous, Uruguay is a bit of an 
unknown, and then there are the hosts, South Africa … This could be quite a tricky 
group for the ageing (and some – especially Irish observers – might say 
undeserving!) French. I am going to assume that Mexico wins and South Africa is 
runner-up”. Wrong anyway, but from a methodological point of view this sounds 
hardly more than a toss-up! 
The study by J.P. Morgan (2010) adapts its QUANT scoring model (used to identify 
long/short trading opportunities in financial markets) to forecasting the soccer World 
Cup outcome by combining several footballistic variables. This scoring model 
delivers the following ranking: 1/ Brazil, 2/ Spain, 3/ England, 4/ Netherlands. Then, 
the calculated scores (for all teams) are used – excluding any tied game – together 
with a “penalty shoot out” metric to decide which country will win each of the 64 
fixtures; the calculation comes out with a England-Spain finals won by England due 
to a better penalty shoot out index. This model confines itself to FIFA World Cup 
variables but does not perform better, predicting only two of the actual semi-finalists. 
UBS (2010) approach states from the very beginning that “socioeconomic factors like 
population size or GDP growth have no explanatory power when it comes to 
forecasting the performance of a specific team” and that “at every World Cup there is 
at least one surprise participant in the semi-finals”. UBS model takes on board: a 
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team‟s past performance in the World Cup; whether or not a team is a host nation; an 
objective quantitative measure that assesses the strength of each team three months 
before the start of the World Cup. The last variable is calculated by using the Elo 
ratings developed to measure and rank the strength of chess players; it is assumed 
to be better than FIFA ranking because it takes into account not only the number of a 
team‟s wins, losses and draws, but also the specific circumstances under which 
those events occurred. Brazil is predicted to have the highest probability to win the 
2010 World Cup (Spain has only the 7th best probability). The best probabilities to 
make for the semi-finals are: 1/ Brazil, 2/ Germany, 3/ Netherlands, 4/ Italy. Still 50% 
correct predictions are found – which also means 50% wrong. 
 
8. Sport surprising outcomes and its metrics: an avenue for further research 
 
Unexpected or surprising outcomes of a sport game or contest have not really been 
analysed so far. The first point to clarify is the difference between the concept of 
outcome uncertainty and a surprising outcome. On the one hand, the uncertainty of 
outcome basically is an ex ante concept – it results from the equality or closeness of 
sporting forces which are going to be opposed in a game or a sport contest – while a 
surprising outcome is necessarily an ex post notion: the actual outcome has 
appeared surprising compared to some ex ante expectation or prediction or standing. 
A surprising outcome is, to some extent, the opposite of outcome uncertainty which is 
deeply rooted in outcome unpredictability. The latter is very high when two teams are 
so close in terms of sporting forces that it is impossible to predict the game outcome 
(or all teams are so close that the league‟s final ranking cannot be predicted). A 
surprising outcome is quite the opposite insofar as it occurs when a sporting outcome 
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is rather predictable but happens to be different from the prediction. This happens 
when opponents in a game (contest) have clearly uneven sporting forces, and the 
underdog wins the favourite, for instance a low FIFA-ranked national team defeats a 
high FIFA-ranked nation. In a nutshell, a surprising sport outcome may be defined as 
the ex post invalidation of an ex ante rather high outcome certainty (predictability) 
whereas outcome uncertainty is the ex ante unpredictability of an ex post actual 
outcome.  
Many metrics may be conceived for measuring the occurrence of a surprising 
sporting outcome. This is an avenue for further research and as a first step macro- 
and micro-assessments of a surprising sporting result can be suggested17. With the 
aforementioned FIFA World Cup prediction model, a macro-surprise would occur 
when a team had not made it for the semi-finals while the model was predicting its 
qualification – and symmetrically when an unpredicted team qualified for the semi-
finals. As to this model, Spain and the Netherlands qualification (to a lesser extent 
Uruguay qualification) were surprising as well as Brazil, Italy and France not making 
it for the semi-finals.  To obtain an overall metrics, suffice it to put that when a team is 
higher (lower) ranked by the model than the actual ranking of the final tournament, 
one witness a surprising sport macro-outcome. The surprise magnitude can be 
assessed by the rank difference between the model‟s prediction and the actual 
outcome (Table 8). In a same way, it would be possible to define macro-surprises 
comparing FIFA ranking and FIFA World Cup outcome or comparing the latter with 
banks‟ predictions. 
Insert Table 8 about there 
With all predictions, three big surprises emerged: Ghana, Paraguay and Japan 
making it for the 1/8th finals. Uruguay also is a rather big surprise, since its 
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qualification for the 1/8th finals and even the ¼ finals were only predicted with our 
model. To some extent England‟s ranking due to a severe loss (1-4) against 
Germany in the 1/8th finals was also surprising. Notice that Goldman Sachs did not 
find any big surprise while the variance between its predictions and achieved 
outcomes is higher than with our model. The latter detects two big surprises: 
Uruguay qualifying for the ¼ finals and the failure of England‟s team. JP Morgan‟s 
predictions have the highest variance with the achieved outcomes whereas it is 
confirmed that FIFA ranking is not a good predictor either.  
However, differences in the exact meaning of measured surprises must be 
underlined. A comparison between the actual FIFA World Cup outcome and our 
model‟s predictions exhibits sporting surprises with regards to nations‟ economic 
development and their past performances in the World Cup. With JP Morgan‟s 
prediction and FIFA ranking, strictly speaking „footballistic‟ surprises are pointed at: 
the actual outcome is surprising compared to exclusively „footballistic‟ variables. 
Goldman Sachs‟ prediction shows how much bookmakers‟ odds before the World 
Cup were distant from the achieved outcomes. Betting, in accordance with Goldman 
Sachs, on Germany as the Cup winner would have resulted in a gambler‟s monetary 
loss while betting on Spain as one of the finalists would have yielded some return.  
A micro-metrics of surprising sport outcomes may be based on a weaker team 
(underdog) winning a stronger team (favourite). If one lower FIFA-ranked team won a 
higher FIFA-ranked team, this would be a micro-surprise. With our model, Ghana-
USA (2-1) in the 1/8th finals was surprising as well as Netherlands-Brazil (2-1) in the 
¼ finals and Spain-Germany (1-0) in the semi-finals. With FIFA ranking and Goldman 
Sachs‟ prediction, the micro-surprises were only Ghana-USA (2-1) and Netherlands-
Brazil (2-1). On the other hand, JP Morgan‟s prediction was surprised by Ghana-USA 
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(2-1) and Germany-England (4-1) in the 1/8th finals and Netherlands-Brazil (2-1) and 
Germany-Argentina (4-0) in the ¼ finals. JP Morgan‟s prediction definitely is the 
furthest from actual outcomes when looking at both micro- and macro-surprises.  
The notion of surprising sporting micro-outcome may be refined with the historical 
variable of our model, checking whether in the 2010 World Cup final tournament a 
nation which never made it for the semi-finals has been able to win a nation which 
already qualified for the semi-finals at least once since 1930. With such a criterion, 
following outcomes are surprising: Ghana-USA (2-1) in the 1/8th finals and during the 
round robin stage Mexico-France (2-0), South Africa-France (2-1), Serbia-Germany 
(1-0), Slovakia-Italy (3-2), and Switzerland-Spain (1-0). Two teams did not survive to 
their surprising losses in the qualification groups (France and Italy) whereas the two 
others even made it for the semi-finals (Germany and Spain).  
 
Conclusion 
 
Since our modelled prediction had been able to correctly detect 70% of actual medal 
winners at the Beijing Games, a nation‟s size (population) and level of economic 
development, once completed with a few dummies, are good predictors of medal 
wins. The latter can be taken as a relevant index for comparing economic 
development across nations in addition to other economic and social indexes. A 
same model does not perform that well with predicting the 2010 FIFA World Cup 
semi-finalists. Soccer World Cup outcomes are in no way an acceptable index of 
economic development. The host country effect (home advantage) is less significant 
in soccer World Cup than in Summer Olympics. However, any economic prediction of 
sporting performance must be taken with a pinch of salt. This is namely due to a 
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number of surprising sporting outcomes. Elaborating on a metrics to quantify them 
should be a promising avenue for further research.  
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1
 Bernard and Busse use the percentage of medal wins by each country i for Mi,t instead. Our 
regressions are calculated with both the absolute number of medals (Table 3) and the percentage of 
medals per country, and the results are not significantly different. 
2
 Hoffmann et al. (2002a) consider that an important determinant of Olympic successes lies in the 
degree to which sporting activities are embedded in a nation’s culture. The proxy used to capture such 
determinant is the total number of times a country has hosted Summer Olympics from 1946 to 1998. 
3
 A discussant has suggested to test in a first stage a “winning versus not winning a medal” hypothesis 
and then estimate, in a second stage, the number of medal wins (when > 0). Here we assume that 
winning zero medal or winning 1, 2, …, n medals results from the same procedure and must be 
estimated with the same explanatory variables.  
4
 A test of maximum likelihood shows that the rho coefficient is significant (Pr = 0.00). 
5
 Our data panel is not balanced since the number of participating countries has increased between 
1976 and 2004, namely due to the break up of the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia and former 
Czechoslovakia (+ 20 countries in the world), only partly compensated by the re-unification of 
Germany and Yemen (- 2 countries).  
6
 A test of maximum likelihood shows that the rho coefficient is not significant (Pr = 0.26) which 
allows to opt for a pooling estimation.  
7
 Result for any other country is available on request addressed to the authors. 
8
 This issue is discussed in depth in Andreff et al. (2008) explaining why we had not been able to 
integrate doping among independent variables despite that we wished to do so. 
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9
 Some Jamaican sprint finalists have been controlled positive in doping tests during the weeks after 
the Beijing Games, which may be another explanation.  
10
 The role of referees is neglected here for two reasons: an imperfect referee is a source of 
competitive unbalance as demonstrated in Groot (2007), and a corrupt referee paves the way for 
another kind of study about corruption in soccer. We make the (rather naive) assumption that there is 
no match fixing and no rigged games even though it is definitely a simplifying assumption in current 
international soccer (Hill, 2009).  
11
 All the results are obviously plagued with endogeneity since the final standing is correlated with ex 
ante ranking and top seeding is determined by ex ante ranking. No methodology is implemented to 
clean or circumvent it. 
12
 Exceptions are team sports and some other sports such as tennis and table tennis.  
13
 Here participating countries refer to those qualified for the soccer World Cup final tournament. Our 
model does not attempt to estimate the determinants of this qualification. 
14
 The calculation formula of FIFA ranking encompasses, among other, a weighted average of the 
team’s three previous FIFA World Cup results. 
15
 The FIFA World Cup final tournament has been hosted twice in France (1938, 1998), Germany 
(1974, 2006), Italy (1934, 1990) and Mexico (1970, 1986). 
16
 Algeria, Australia, Cameroon, Denmark, Ghana, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Japan, New Zealand, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Paraguay, RDP (North) Korea, and Switzerland.  
17
 Micro here means at a one game level, and not an aggregated result as the final ranking of the World 
Cup final tournament – which defines a macro-surprise (coming out from 64 fixtures). 
